

VI.

C. THWART ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN POWERS WHICH CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN
US INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR ARE DISRUPTIVE OF THE CONDUCT OF US FOREIGN
POLICY

Although a number of foreign powers resort to the same means, the Soviet Union is unique for the scope, diversity, and sophistication of its efforts--outside the traditional bounds of diplomacy and diplomatic and informational activities and normally masked--to undermine the credibility of the US government at home, to discredit and disrupt US foreign policy abroad, and to drive wedges between the US and its allies and friends. The range of activities--under the policy direction of the International and International Information departments of the CPSU and generally under the operational direction of the KGB--include media manipulation, front groups, propaganda, agents of influence, and disinformation. In Soviet parlance, these are collectively described as "active measures" and constitute a major tool of Soviet foreign policy.

Counterintelligence forces have a significant but by no means sole responsibility for countering this genre of threat. Actions to sensitize US officialdom, media, and public at home, public diplomacy and covert action initiatives abroad and counterintelligence efforts all combine to constitute a multi-faceted response.

Heightening Domestic Awareness

The Administration and the Congress have done much to accumulate source material on Soviet active measures in the United States. Key examples are the output of the State-chaired Interagency Working Group charged with monitoring and exposing Soviet active measures worldwide; the reports generated by several congressional hearings over the past four years; [the major FBI study on Soviet active measures in the United States from 1982 to 1985;] and several other agency studies. (U) FBI

However, there has been only limited dissemination of this excellent educational material in the public domain. Some reports, [including the in depth FBI study, are classified.] Monies have not been budgeted for large scale printing of the principal unclassified reports or the editing and reproduction of extracts thereof. More importantly, as with the informational field generally, no agency is specifically authorized--and, therefore, none has the requisite infrastructure in place--to keep the American public as a whole abreast of the extent and implications of this category of Soviet activity. FBI (U)

To increase the American public's awareness, the following needs to be done:

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- Member agencies of the Active Measures Working Group should give priority to the production of unclassified analyses. In this

connection, [the FBI should provide sanitized extracts of its annual report on "Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures in the United States."] (U) FBI

- State or the cognizant Congressional committees should fund jointly or individually large scale printing and widest possible distribution of the unclassified report on Soviet disinformation and media manipulation activities affecting the United States which the 1985 Foreign Relations Authorization Act mandates that the Secretary of State provide to the Congress.
- The Working Group should redouble its efforts, through the public affairs officers of the member agencies, to enlist PVOs/NGOs as distribution channels for relevant materials and as spokesmen in local forums on Soviet active measures.
- The FBI should continue to provide ~~investigative~~ support and information to the Working Group and ensure that its security awareness briefings in the private sector include appropriate coverage of Soviet active measures. (U) FBI

Public Diplomacy

Basic to the countering of Soviet active measures abroad is the prompt and authoritative denial by official spokesmen of Soviet forgeries or other overtly propagated lies about the United States and, in the case of Soviet

disinformation, the issuance of authoritative statements concerning real US actions or objectives. Public diplomacy, however, should be more pro-active than reactive; and thus the creation of an NSC structure to support the US diplomatic missions abroad in their interface with and impact on foreign governments, media, and publics. The aforementioned Working Group has been the principal tool of this national-level support mechanism; and, consequently, the bulk of its activities have been focused on the provision of materials for use by diplomats, mission public affairs officers, and the US supported radio networks. Working Group members on trips to key countries have also used materials provided through this mechanism to sensitize and share information with friendly government officials, interested academics, and journalists concerned with Soviet active measures. While clearly productive, the outreach and impact of these activities have been severely limited by the same factors (materials and money) discussed above.


Based on the experience of the last few years, the following needs to be done:

- The Working Group member agencies should commit to their share of the funds required for the long planned seminars on active measures to be held in Western Europe and Latin America; and for more frequent travel of team members to individual countries. Concomitantly, USIA should increase production and dissemination of active measures-related materials.

- Considerably more attention should be given to the anticipation of likely Soviet active measures campaigns in order to put preemptive measures in place. Success depends on improved analyses on the part of the Intelligence Community and more initiative on the part of the substantive interagency committees.

Covert Action

The CIA complements and supplements public diplomacy initiatives through the conduct of psychological and political actions not attributable to any agency of the US government.

 (b)(1)(b)(3)
all with the intent of exposing and discrediting active measures as an instrument of Soviet and Soviet surrogate policy. Since these are exceptional tools and best employed selectively, their contribution is directly proportional to the overall effectiveness of overt public diplomacy campaigns. For the future:

 (b)(1)(b)(3)

Counterintelligence Role

[Within the United States, the FBI is the primary instrumentality for identification and tracking of domestically conducted or domestically based active measures; for the investigations leading to exposure and discrediting, arrest or expulsion of individuals or organizations conducting these activities; and for operations to effect neutralization by other means.] (u) FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) FBI

The priority tasks are:

- The FBI should continue, and augment as feasible, efforts to penetrate international front organizations and the CPUSA and its subsidiaries

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) FBI

[REDACTED]
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